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POLYGYNY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Rose McDermott∗
Jonathan Cowden∗∗
ABSTRACT
This Essay examines the link between polygyny, or one man who is married
to multiple woman, and the physical security of women and children, and
political rights and civil liberties using a unique dataset of 171 countries
drawn from the WomanStats Project. Controlling for the independent effects of
gross domestic product and sex ratio, we find statistically significant
relationships between polygyny and an entire downstream suite of negative
consequences for men, women, children, and the nation-state, including the
following outcomes: discrepancy between law and practice concerning
women’s equality, birth rate, rates of primary and secondary education for
male and female children, difference between males and females in HIV
infection, age of marriage, maternal mortality, life expectancy, sex trafficking,
female genital mutilation, domestic violence, inequity in the treatment of males
and females before the law, defense expenditures, and political rights and civil
liberties. Elevated frequency of polygynous marriage thus tends to be
associated with increases in behavioral constraints and physical costs
experienced by women and children in particular but also exerts effects that
redound poorly to the majority of poor men as well. Defenders of such
practices often refer to the importance of religious freedom in defending their
views in support of polygyny; however, our data clearly show that such
practices impose tremendous personal harm on their victims. Data taken from
virtually every country in the world clearly documents polygyny as a practice
that constitutes a fundamental abuse of basic human rights and dignity.
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INTRODUCTION
After the events of September 11, 2001, academics, pundits, policymakers,
and other members of the interested public wondered why “they” hated “us.”
And, indeed, whether derived from politics, economics, religion, or history,
some degree of resentment towards the West and Western values is no doubt
fuelled by struggles over land, resources, power, and preferred institutions for
political and economic structures.1 If these were the only sources of enmity,
the search for peace would be hard enough. But the problem is worsened by a
fundamental clash of values specifically surrounding the appropriate role of
women in society that emerges entirely independently of economic and
political contests, although such issues often serve to fuel such conflicts.
Because Western values often encourage a foundation of at least legal equality
between the sexes, threats to the assumed sociopolitical dominance of men in
areas that strongly espouse these traditions provoke systematic hostility and
opposition. As a result, we suggest that the original question is the wrong one
to pose. Rather than counterposing East against West, arguing about the clash
of civilizations in the prototypical Huntington sense,2 the critical concern
should actually revolve around the sources and consequences of violence by
men toward women as the root of conflict both within and among nations.
What are some of the origins of the violence that men direct toward women? Is
it simply rooted in male sexual desire for women and the anger and frustration
that may result when men hold women responsible for their own drives? Or do
men seek to control women simply because they are physically and financially
stronger and because they are able to get away with exerting power over those
with fewer resources? Or does male violence emerge from a much broader
array of social incentives and permissions? And what are the consequences of
such violence, not only for women and children but also for the men who
instigate it and for the societies that sanction it? These patterns of violence
often begin in the home and serve as models for the assumed hierarchical
relationships between the sexes as well as implicit endorsement for dominance,
coercion, and violence as the proper form of conflict resolution in society more
broadly.3
1

See, e.g., GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD: THE TRAIL OF POLITICAL ISLAM 1 (2002); BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM AND
(1993). See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (discussing that cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion,
disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War era).
2 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1.
3 See generally SYLVIANE AGACINSKI, PARITY OF THE SEXES (Lisa Walsh trans., 2001) (claiming that
the duality of the sexes will be practiced and reproduced across time).
THE WEST
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We argue here that female financial and social independence are feared not
merely because of their material effects but also because of the threat they pose
to the cultural values, status, and personal power of many men, particularly in
underdeveloped and developing regions of the world. Specifically, the
emancipation of women erodes men’s control over their own families in ways
that are potentially culturally humiliating and emotionally painful for men,
especially those emanating from a tradition of strong patriarchy. In short, the
prospect of liberated women threatens male status. In addition, it often also
threatens the position of senior women in these developing societies who are
allowed to dominate junior women, such as daughters and daughters-in-law, as
well as junior men, including sons. Note here that men are not necessarily the
primary guardians of a culture that oppresses women in these circumstances;
women actively participate in such repression because they refuse to give up
control over those few cultural areas, such as control inside the home, to which
they have been assigned by men, including circumscribing the activities of
their female family members. The prospect of female emancipation therefore
provides a potent source of male—and sometimes even female—support for
more secular or democratic movements, particularly in more patriarchal
societies.
This process is exacerbated by the common practice of patrilocality,
whereby women move to the town, village, or home of their husbands, often
leaving behind the fathers, brothers, or uncles who might protect them if they
lived closer to home.4 Without such protection from family members, the only
prospect many women have for protection from abusive relatives is to give
birth to sons who are valued by the father’s family.5 These sons, in turn, may
prove loyal to these mothers. Such a family structure further erodes the bonds
between husband and wife since the husband’s primary female loyalty often
remains with his mother rather than his wife or his daughters.6 Such a
privileging of parent–child bonds over the marital bond diminishes the
possibility for creating models of equality between the sexes for children of
such unions.

4 See Ting Ji, Jing-Jing Xu & Ruth Mace, Intergenerational and Sibling Conflict Under Patrilocality,
25 HUM. NATURE 66, 67 (2014).
5 Valerie M. Hudson, The Missing Girls of China and India: What Is Being Done?, 41 CUMB. L. REV.
67, 69 (2011).
6 Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen & Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, What Is the Relationship Between
Inequity in Family Law and Violence Against Women? Approaching the Issue of Legal Enclaves, 7 POL. &
GENDER 453 (2011).
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We define patriarchal societies as those in which men have power over
women. Aspects of patriarchal cultures may be explained or exacerbated, at
least in part, by patrilocality and polygynist family structures but are not
defined by such characteristics. Recognition of the way in which patrilocality
and polygyny each independently and in combination precipitate violence
toward women and children in these societies draws attention to the structural
problems associated with societies that combine these features and opens some
possibilities for ameliorating its effects.
Here, we specifically address simultaneous, as opposed to sequential,
polygyny because it reduces the availability of young women for young men,
posing tremendous consequences for young men’s prospects for marriage and
reproduction, as well as increasing the risk for political violence.7 We show
how this causes increased levels of many forms of violence in and across these
areas.
An essential point is that men’s desire for patriarchal control of women is
not so arbitrary that it can be blown away by a good breath of Western logic,
education, or liberalism. Rather, it finds its roots in strong traditions and
structures, often endorsed, wrongly or otherwise, by religious beliefs that
privilege male power and dominance in all aspects of life.8 The violent effects
emerge from the widespread lifestyle of patriarchy, polygyny, and patrilocality
and therefore have continuing significance in many countries today where such
practices continue to dominate cultural and economic traditions.9 We trace
these origins of male power and note their consequences for the lives and
status of women throughout the developing world. We do so by discussing the
independent effects of patriarchy and polygyny. We then provide a detailed
analysis of the impact of these forces on a wide variety of manifestations of
violence toward women and children using data derived from the WomanStats
Project.10 At the end, we consider the challenges faced by policymakers and
human-rights advocates who wish to begin to redress such gender inequalities.

7 VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION (2004); Valerie M. Hudson & Andrea Den Boer, A Surplus of Men, a
Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest States, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2002, at 5, 11, 29.
8 See, e.g., DISCIPLINES OF FAITH: STUDIES IN RELIGION, POLITICS AND PATRIARCHY (Jim Obelkevich,
Lyndal Roper & Raphael Samuel eds., 1987); PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FEMALE POWER AND MALE
DOMINANCE: ON THE ORIGINS OF SEXUAL INEQUALITY 4–5 (1981).
9 Deniz Kandiyoti, Bargaining with Patriarchy, 2 GENDER & SOC’Y 274, 274–75, 283–85 (1988);
Barbara Smuts, The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy, 6 HUM. NATURE 1, 10–20 (1995).
10 WOMENSTATS PROJECT, http://www.womanstats.org (last visited May 17, 2015).
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I. POLYGYNY
To begin, a few definitions are in order. Polygamy includes both polygyny,
where one man has many wives, as well as polyandry, where one woman has
many husbands.11 Political issues surrounding laws about polygyny are
exacerbated by the cultural and religious circumstances that are often
associated with it. Polygyny remains a common practice around the world,
existing in more than 83% of 849 cultures worldwide;12 in about 35% of cases,
such practices are commonly sororal, meaning men marry sisters.13 Such a
practice may be undertaken to help reduce the risk of inter-marital tension and
hostility among wives or toward children of such unions. Everywhere, the
practice is more widespread among high-status, high-wealth men.14 By
contrast, polyandry is found in only 4 of 849 cultures worldwide, occurs
mostly in Nepal, and always co-occurs with polygyny, such that high-status
men in such cultures also take multiple wives.15 In such cultures, polyandry
tends to occur only briefly and among low-status men, although it is often
fraternal in nature as well.16
However, to be clear, the consequences of violence we document here do
not extend to polyandry. As a result, we examine polygynous practices where
one man has more than one wife simultaneously. Polygyny holds important
implications for reproductive success and control, and having children with
more than one wife at a time affects this process in ways that differ in
significant ways from having children sequentially with different mates over
time. In our analysis, the critical concern revolves around the sources and
consequences of violence of men toward women and children and how this
affects the tendency toward violence and suppression of civil rights and
political liberties within states. This latter phenomena results in large part from
the surplus of men that occurs in polygynous systems where many junior men

11 Stephen T. Emlen & Lewis W. Oring, Ecology, Sexual Selection, and the Evolution of Mating Systems,
197 SCIENCE 215, 217 tbl.1 (1977).
12 ALLAN D. COULT & ROBERT WESLEY HABENSTEIN, CROSS TABULATIONS OF MURDOCK’S WORLD
ETHNOGRAPHIC SAMPLE (1965); see also GEORGE PETER MURDOCK, ATLAS OF WORLD CULTURES 133 (1981);
Gray, J. Patrick, Ethnographic Atlas Codebook, 10 WORLD CULTURES 86 (1998), available at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/Codebook4EthnoAtlas.pdf.
13 COULT & HABENSTEIN, supra note 12.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember & Bobbi S. Low, Comparing Explanations of Polygyny,
41 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 428, 433 fig.1 (2007).
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need to be evicted from the society in order for senior men to have access to
multiple wives.17
In addition, we are not concerned with simultaneous sexual relationships
that do not involve childbearing or prospects for the intergenerational transfer
of wealth as a result of the shared economic circumstances that remain intrinsic
to legal marriages. That is because there can be two potential meanings of
polygyny, the first as a social bonding system and the second as a breeding
one. It is possible to conceptualize these two types of systems in a two-by-two
table. Most mammals, including gorillas for example, have both polygynous
social and polygynous breeding systems, while there are no species that exhibit
a polygynous social system in concert with a monogamous mating structure.18
By contrast, most birds engage in monogamous social bonding in the context
of polygynous breeding, while a few, including the black vulture, demonstrate
both monogamous bonding and breeding are preferences.19 However, in human
systems, such monogamous breeding structures are often socially imposed and
occur in large, complex societies or ecologically imposed by limited resources,
which make it prohibitive for men to provide sufficiently for multiple wives or
children.
We argue that violence toward women and children and suppression of
basic rights can be potentiated by a number of factors, including patriarchy,
patrilocality, and polygyny. These cultural features and social structures often
go hand-in-hand and, in combination, enhance male control over women and
children in ways that allow, and often encourage, violence and suppression of
political rights and liberties. In particular, we demonstrate, using detailed
empirical data, that polygyny is strongly correlated with a wide array of
violence against women and children as well as suppression of political rights
and liberties and increased spending on weapons.
While many westerners argue that it is inappropriate to make value
judgments about other cultures’ preferences regarding social structures,20 we
see the issue of polygyny in terms of basic human rights. We demonstrate here
17 See, e.g., Kelly R. Schwab, Note, Lost Children: The Abuse and Neglect of Minors in Polygamous
Communities of North America, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 315, 334 (2010).
18 See ECOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION: BIRDS AND MAMMALS 352–78, 452–70 (Daniel I.
Rubenstein & Richard W. Wrangham eds., 1986).
19 See id. at 175–200, 452–70.
20 See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 402,
411 (1984); Melford E. Spiro, Cultural Relativism and the Future of Anthropology, 1 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 259 (1986).
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that such rights, particularly those of women and children, are fiercely
abrogated in societies and cultures where polygyny is present.
A. The Persistence of Patriarchal Values
In our construction, patriarchal values are promoted by two important
features: patrilocality and polygyny. The effects of these variables may appear
partly regional and partly religious, but we postulate that each feature will
exert an independent effect on the outcomes of interest: violence by men
against women and children. For our purposes, we examine this outcome along
three separate dimensions: violence against women, violence against children,
and state-level effects. For the final dimension, we extend our analysis to
examine the effect of such marital structures and the economic, political, and
social practices that often accompany them—civil rights, political freedoms,
and weapons procurement—as a proxy for the propensity of the state to
consider and model violence as a viable means of conflict resolution between
states.
Patriarchy can exert its effects through many subtle and overlapping
mechanisms. One of the ways in which this power can manifest is through
male control over female marriage decisions. For example, male expectation of
control over a daughter’s marriage is critical in many societies because a man’s
economic and social status is importantly determined by his kinswomen’s
alliances.21 A man who marries into a family with many strong and wealthy
men enhances his ability to protect his flock and to increase his local status
through such an association. Arranged marriages are therefore traditionally
preferred to love matches.22 In the service of maximizing the benefits from a
marriage, a woman’s value is enhanced by various practices that restrict her
own romantic choices and promote her chastity, including claustration, genital
mutilation, and veiling.23 Control is supported by stringent punishments for
women who flout cultural norms.24
While the degree to which men exert physical control over women in
particular societies remains contingent on a host of sociological and economic
21

See Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against Women, 3 HUM. NATURE 1 (1992).
See Menelaos Apostolou, Sexual Selection Under Parental Choice: The Role of Parents in the
Evolution of Human Mating, 28 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 403, 404 (2007).
23 Glenn E. Weisfeld, Social Status and Values in Traditional Arab Culture, in 1 SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY 75 (Lee Ellis ed., 1993).
24 See Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR
WOMEN? 7, 14–17 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1999).
22
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factors, men retain control over the vast majority of physical resources needed
to survive, including money and property.25 This often becomes codified in
family law customs and practices that restrict a female’s ability to marry
someone of her choosing, divorce an abusive husband, retain custody of
children following an imposed divorce, or inherit property.26 In many parts of
the world, men’s lives exist primarily in the public sphere while women’s lives
still remain largely confined to the household.27 Ironically, this segregation of
sexes can lead to a remarkable degree of female independence over their own
social lives and worlds within the home.28 Nevertheless, women continue to be
restricted in their public movements from the time of puberty in many
developing countries.29 Such limitations prevent many women from being able
to get an education or to achieve financial independence through employment.
Instead, women often remain at the mercy of those men who can provide for
their sustenance.
A woman’s position in these societies thus becomes largely determined by
her marriage. But because divorce is so common and can be granted only by
male fiat in many areas, women’s position in the hierarchy remains tenuous at
best;30 indeed, in many parts of the world, men often retain control of all
important resources, including custody of any children, while women revert to
the status of property in the hands of other male relatives following divorce.31
Whatever security a women has results from the formal nature of her marriage
contract and the strength of her family of origin, particularly her male relatives
in the specific area, which is why patrilocality imposes such insecurity on so
many women. Any man can be dishonored by threats to the chastity and virtue
of his female relatives, and killings of honor on behalf of these women may be
committed by brothers, fathers, or husbands to retain family status.32 However,

25 LINDA MEALEY, SEX DIFFERENCES: DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES (2000);
Lawrence Rosen, The Negotiation of Reality: Male-Female Relations in Sefrou, Morocco, in WOMEN IN THE
MUSLIM WORLD 561, 562–66 (Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978).
26 Hudson et al., supra note 6, at 462–63.
27 Susan Moller Okin, Gender, the Public, and the Private, in FEMINISM AND POLITICS 116, 117–18
(Anne Phillips ed., 1998).
28 Lloyd A. Fallers & Margaret C. Fallers, Sex Roles in Edremit, in MEDITERRANEAN FAMILY
STRUCTURES 243, 246–49 (J.G. Peristiany ed., 1976).
29 Okin, supra note 27, at 117–18.
30 MEALEY, supra note 25, at 341; Rosen, supra note 25, at 565–66.
31 See Hudson et al., supra note 6, at 455–60.
32 Phyllis Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, MIDDLE E.Q., Spring 2010, at 3, available at
http://www.meforum.org/2646/worldwide-trends-in-honor-killings.
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fathers most often blame their daughters, rather than the perpetrator, for
violations of purity.33
A man uses his control to ensure that a woman marries not just to her
advantage (as he perceives it) but more importantly to the advantage of himself
and his male kin. A woman marrying below her social status dishonors her
family, whereas her marriage into a large- and high-status kin-group creates or
cements a relationship of social importance for her entire family.34 He, or other
male relatives, might benefit in other ways as well. For example, by
exchanging his daughter for a wife for himself or a male relative, a man might
use his control over a daughter to get an extra bride and thus increase his own
reproductive advantage by making it possible to have more sons. Equally, he
could resolve a blood feud by giving a woman in marriage. Or, by obtaining as
high a bride-price as possible, he increases his wealth (and thus his own future
marriage prospects).
Thus, male control over women under his dominion constitutes a key part
of his family life as well as his social and economic status. Since his women
increase in value with their modesty and chastity, it is vital for him to control
their behavior around other men. Women also participate in enforcing and
perpetuating these standards by often “out-bidding” each other in seeking to
appear pious in order to improve their marriage prospects.35 This phenomenon
clearly contributes to the high divorce rate in many of these areas as men come
to find out that, once married, their wives may try to break out of the strict
standards they adhered to prior to marriage. Yet, a woman who did not adhere
to such standards prior to marriage would reduce her prospects since her male
relatives would not be able to secure her a higher-status marriage partner. By
contrast, there has traditionally been “no objection to a man marrying a woman
of lower status, since the woman, in the view of the jurists, is in any case
inferior, and no social damage could therefore result from such a marriage.”36
This partly results from the inherent value placed on female beauty, which
exists independent of social status, and also from the fact that the real value a
woman offers to a man lies in the number and physical strength of her male

33

Fallers & Fallers, supra note 28, at 259.
See Vern Baxter & A.V. Margavio, Honor, Status, and Aggression in Economic Exchange, 18 SOC.
THEORY 399, 400 (2000).
35 David S. Patel, Concealing to Reveal: The Informational Role of Islamic Dress, 24 RATIONALITY &
SOC’Y 295, 298–99 (2012).
36 BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: 2000 YEARS OF HISTORY FROM THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY TO
THE PRESENT DAY 180 (1995).
34
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kinfolk and offspring, which is another reason why infertile women in such
societies often become particularly vulnerable.
It is therefore inevitable that when confronted with attempts to promote
women’s political, economic, or sexual independence, men from traditional
cultures, espousing conservative expectations about patriarchal control, will
feel threatened and resentful. And, as noted above, men are not the only ones
whose positions may be threatened. Senior women, who retain control over
their daughters-in-law and young sons, may also find their positions
compromised by any threat to the existing patriarchal system.
However, as Kandiyoti argues, inherent contradictions lie at the root of
certain types of patriarchy, and, in the end, polygyny and the subjugation of
women “ultimately mutilate[] and distort[] the male psyche.”37 This results
from the complex dynamic between the sexes in societies where the marital
bond remains weak relative to the mother–child bond or to bonds within
sexes.38 Societies where men feel a stronger loyalty to their mothers than their
wives encourage violence toward junior women by senior women who know
that their sons will not oppose their actions. In addition, polygyny means that
there will not be enough women to provide mates for lower-status men, who
will likely remain childless.
Those who work for female equality commonly assume that education or
modernism will erode such attitudes and values, but history shows the
resilience of entrenched cultural traditions that validate, instantiate, and
perpetuate patriarchal control. Although the French Revolution inspired
widespread debate about the emancipation of women, it led to little change for
women compared to men. For example, even in the wake of the French
Revolution’s ostensible commitment to liberty and equality, there was
persistent resistance to change in women’s attire.39 Even in Turkey, one of the
most westernized countries, Atatürk never prohibited the veil, though he
banned the fez; and modern Islamic revival has been notably associated with a

37 Deniz Kandiyoti, The Paradoxes of Masculinity: Some Thoughts on Segregated Societies, in
DISLOCATING MASCULINITY: COMPARATIVE ETHNOGRAPHIES 196, 197 (Andrea Cornwall & Nancy
Lindisfarne eds., 1994).
38 See ALICE S. ROSSI & PETER H. ROSSI, OF HUMAN BONDING: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS ACROSS THE
LIFE COURSE 251–72 (1990).
39 See OLWEN H. HUFTON, WOMEN AND THE LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 18–19
(1992); LYNN HUNT, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND CLASS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 82–86 (1986); see also
JOAN B. LANDES, WOMEN AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE AGE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 146 (1988).
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return by women, but not men, to traditional dress in Turkey and elsewhere.40
Likewise, there is no evidence that such consequences of modernization, such
as the acquisition of wealth or exposure to Western ideas, tend to reduce the
patriarchal value system. Thus, “the emancipation of women is one of the main
grievances of the fundamentalists and its reversal is in the forefront of their
programme.”41 A fundamental clash of values over the rights of women
relative to men will therefore not be resolved by anything as straightforward as
economic globalization or improvements in literacy. A deeper understanding
of the nature of resentment toward female independence and equality must
incorporate a realistic account of why patriarchal control is so highly valued by
so many men, particularly in polygynous societies.
One school sees patriarchy as essentially arbitrary, emerging from specific
historical events that no longer justify its maintenance. Women’s political
marginalization and loss of freedom has been traced, for example, to the eighth
and ninth centuries, when international conquests and the acquisition of
women slaves gave men exceptional power in sexual politics.42 This
perspective implies that if modern men are presented with enough pressure for
equality, they may be persuaded to abandon their old-fashioned ideals.43 But
the strong resistance that many men have shown to women’s increasing
independence and striving for equality suggests the alternative view that we
propose. In our view, patriarchal control is not merely the arbitrary remnant of
a temporary historical culture, but it is rather intimately associated with the
prevailing family structure, economic system, and access to reproductive rights
and freedoms. For example, Tertilt finds that “banning polygyny . . . . reduces
fertility by 40 percent, increases savings by 70 percent, and raises output per
person by 170 percent.”44
Ironically, it appears to be the case that societies, including agricultural
ones, where women possess more productive value and are thus more
independent, produce higher rates of polygyny.45 This seems to be the case

40

See LEWIS, supra note 36, at 180.
Id. at 383.
42 FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S
RIGHTS IN ISLAM 148–52 (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1987).
43 See SHERYL SANDBERG WITH NELL SCOVELL, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 159–
72 (2013).
44 Michèle Tertilt, Polygyny, Fetility, and Savings, 113 J. POL. ECON. 1341, 1365 (2005).
45 Ron Lesthaeghe et al., Post-Partum Abstinence, Polygyny, and Age at Marriage: A Macro-Level
Analysis of Sub-Saharan Societies, in NUPTIALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: CONTEMPORARY
41
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because women in these societies must balance their productive and
reproductive responsibilities wisely. Long periods of postpartum abstinence
(i.e., over a year) accomplish this goal while encouraging male polygyny. In
essence, different women take turns with the same man to balance their
productive and reproductive activities through polygynous processes.
Giving a kinswoman in marriage is one important mechanism for alliance
formation. In particular, male children of such unions establish strong
incentives for each side of the family to invest in the resources that will go to
those children.46 In these circumstances, the high value that a man places on
his control of women is no whim. Rather, it is central to his ability to function
effectively as a father and family provider.47 Control over a woman confers
status precisely because it ensures paternity over her children and thus helps
establish and cement networks of control.
B. Polygyny and Male Violence
Wealth-based polygyny is widespread.48 Polygyny can be potentiated by
other sources, such as the uneven accumulation of wealth in oil-based
economies. The results in some cases are extreme. The Crown Princes of Saudi
Arabia, defined as the male descendants of Ibn Saud (who founded the country
and died in 1953), are estimated to number between 6,000 and 7,000.49 Not
only does polygyny increase the number of unmarried men, but the uneven
wealth distribution that accompanies it presents a further predictor of violence.
For example, the Gini coefficient of inequality across household incomes
accounts for most of the difference between homicide rates between Canada
and the United States.50 Polygyny is concentrated everywhere in the wealthier
families and leads to an accumulation of unmarried men in poorer classes.51

ANTROPOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 25, 27–28 (Caroline H. Bledsoe & Gilles Pison eds.,
1994).
46 Frank J. Floyd, Laura A. Gilliom & Catherine L. Costigan, Marriage and the Parenting Alliance:
Longitudinal Prediction of Change in Parenting Perceptions and Behaviors, 69 CHILD DEV. 1461 (1998).
47 See Weisfeld, supra note 23, at 77–88.
48 COULT & HABENSTEIN, supra note 12; Patrick, supra note 12.
49 Frontline: The House of Saud, PBS (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
saud/tree/.
50 Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Darwinism and the Roots of Machismo, SCI. AM. PRESENTS, 1999,
no. 3, at 8.
51 Richard Dawkins, Wealth, Polygyny, and Reproductive Success, 9 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 190 (1986);
Frederic L. Pryor, Simulation of the Impact of Social and Economic Institutions on the Size Distribution of
Income and Wealth, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 50 (1973).
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Polygyny therefore has the unfortunate consequence of generating a class
of people—young unmarried men—who are statistically inclined to violence.
For example, most homicides in Canada and the United States result from the
actions of males aged 15–35; among those, the majority are committed by men
between the ages of 20 and 29; and of those, the majority are committed by
unmarried men.52 In his study of the relationship between single men and
social violence in American history, David Courtwright argues that
[w]here married men have been scarce or parental supervision
wanting, violence and disorder have flourished, as in the mining
camps, cattle towns, Chinatowns, black ghettos, and the small hours
of the morning. But when stable family life has been the norm for
men and boys, violence and disorder have diminished. . . .
. . . What we should not doubt is the social utility of the family, the
institution best suited to shape, control and sublimate the energies of
young men.53

Similarly in India, districts with higher ratios of men to women have higher
rates of homicide.54
This phenomenon has both a social and a physiological basis. Mazur and
Booth report that men with high levels of testosterone, including unmarried
men, are more likely to exhibit violent and antisocial behaviors, including
getting into trouble with the law, substance abuse, and other forms of
aggressive behavior.55 This is at least in part because testosterone acts in the
face of challenge, especially threats to social status. Unmarried men searching
for mates are more likely to get involved in intrasexual competition with other
men, which can easily turn violent.56 In addition, Mazur and Michalek show
that age-adjusted testosterone is not constant over time.57 Rather, male
testosterone increases in the years surrounding divorce and decreases in the
years surrounding marriage, independent of age.58 But male testosterone drops
52

Daly & Wilson, supra note 50, at 12.
DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE
FRONTIER TO THE INNER CITY 280 (1996).
54 Jean Drèze & Reetika Khera, Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from Homicide Data,
26 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 335 (2000).
55 Allan Mazur & Alan Booth, Testosterone and Dominance in Men, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 353
(1998).
56 Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male
Syndrome, 6 ETHNOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 59 (1985).
57 Allan Mazur & Jack Michalek, Marriage, Divorce and Male Testosterone, 77 SOC. FORCES 315
(1998).
58 Id.
53
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in the time surrounding courtship and marriage, and drops further with the
birth of each child.59 Thus, men married to women receive beneficent effects
on their propensity toward violence and aggression relative to unmarried men.
Mazur and Michalek argue that this phenomenon helps explain both the low
criminality found in married men and the high rates of domestic abuse seen in
cases of divorce.60 This greater propensity toward violence in young men is
likely supported, at least in part, by the higher baseline levels of testosterone
found within these age ranges.
The presence of large numbers of young unmarried men can arise not only
from polygyny but also from distorted overall sex ratios, deriving from such
factors as sex-selected abortion, female infanticide, high rates of maternal
death in childbirth, and poorer health treatment for women. High sex ratios of
men to women occur, for example, in regions such Afghanistan and Pakistan,
as well as other countries such as India and China.61 These high sex ratios have
historically been associated with intra-society violence, aggressive
foreign-policy initiatives, and governments that, aware of the threat to the
stability of their own regime posed by organizations of unmarried men, tended
to be repressive and authoritarian.62 But here we concentrate on the
independent effects of polygyny on violence specifically directed toward
women and children, as well as those that affect the state. Polygyny remains
problematic in this regard because for every man who has more than one wife,
another man may not be able to find any wife at all.
Even terrorist groups understand the threat posed by large numbers of
unmarried men. One of the most notorious terrorist groups ever, the Black
September movement, conducted the seizure of Israeli athletes at the Munich
Olympics in 1972.63 When Arafat’s organization sought to dismantle this
group for fear of their violence undermining broader political objectives,
military leaders decided to simply marry them off.64 Through a system of

59 Peter B. Gray et al., Marriage and Fatherhood Are Associated with Lower Testosterone in Males,
23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 193, 194 (2002).
60 Mazur & Michalek, supra note 57, at 320–28.
61 Hudson & Den Boer, supra note 7, at 7, 9 tbl.2.
62 Id. at 25–26.
63 CHRISTOPHER DOBSON, BLACK SEPTEMBER: ITS SHORT, VIOLENT HISTORY (1974); AARON J. KLEIN,
STRIKING BACK: THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS MASSACRE AND ISRAEL’S DEADLY RESPONSE (2005); SIMON
REEVE, ONE DAY IN SEPTEMBER: THE FULL STORY OF THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS MASSACRE AND THE
ISRAELI REVENGE OPERATION “WRATH OF GOD” 1–2 (2000).
64 Bruce Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: How the Terrorists Stopped Terrorism, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2001,
at 34, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/12/all-you-need-is-love/302351/.
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financial incentives and structured “mixers,” members of Black September
married attractive young Palestinian women.65 When such men were later
asked to leave the country with legal passports, not a single one agreed to go,
for fear of losing his family because of past terrorist activities.66 The Northern
Ireland Prison Service used similar strategies when they offered early release
to former IRA and loyalist terrorists. None of the men who were offered early
parole through a system designed to reaffirm family ties ever returned to
prison.67 The larger point remains that unmarried men simply have less to lose.
They also have more incentive to seek dominance through less conventional
and more dangerous means, in hopes of garnering the resources required to
attract sexual partners.
Entirely aside from international power struggles, therefore, polygynous
societies contain the basis for violent response toward women and children.
The combination of distorted sex ratios, particularly in the poorer classes, and
relatively large wealth differentials means that resentment and anger towards
women can be predictably fuelled with a ready supply of frustrated, risk-prone
young men. When this mixture is added to a volatile political system, the
dangers become obvious.
II. ANALYSIS
Here we use a unique data source, the WomanStats Project, to provide a
substantial cross-cultural analysis of (1) the impact of polygamous
relationships on women’s equality; (2) the impact of polygamous relationships
on children, including child brides and the children of polygamous unions; and
(3) the impact of polygamous relationships on the nation-state.
Polygynous mating systems are known to promote intensified male–male
competition for females and tend to restrict options for females because of
male coercion.68 We examine the link between polygyny and the physical
security of women and children using a unique dataset of 171 countries.
Controlling for the independent effects of gross domestic product (GDP) and
sex ratio, we find statistically significant relationships between polygyny and
65

Id. at 36.
Id.
67 Id.
68 F. Marlowe, Paternal Investment and the Human Mating System, 51 BEHAV. PROCESSES 45, 54
(2000); Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts, Male Aggression and Sexual Coercion of Females in
Nonhuman Primates and Other Mammals: Evidence and Theoretical Implications, 22 ADVANCES STUDY
BEHAV. 1, 3–11 (1993).
66
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the following: discrepancy between law and practice concerning women’s
equality, birth rate, rates of primary and secondary education for male and
female children, difference between males and females in HIV infection, age
of marriage, maternal mortality, life expectancy, sex trafficking, female genital
mutilation, domestic violence, inequity in the treatment of males and females
before the law, defense expenditures, and political rights and civil liberties.
Elevated frequency of polygynous marriage thus tends to be associated with
increases in behavioral constraints and physical costs experienced by women
and children in particular. Since our results control for relative wealth (using
GDP), these costs appear to be due, at least in part, to structural and
institutional attempts to control female sexuality and reproduction independent
of economic constraints.
A. Data and Methods
The WomenStats Project provided national data on polygyny and most of
the effects we examine here.69 Data used in this Essay are sampled from 171
countries for the period 2000 to 2007. We used year-matched data when
available. Our maximum gap between data samples was five years, a short
period compared to rates of societal change. The WomanStats database
provides the largest compilation of information on the status of women in the
world, coding over 260 variables for 174 countries. Because we limited our
observations to countries with over 200,000 people in the population, we
restricted our analysis to 171 of these countries. The preponderance of data
came from scholarly research, NGO and IGO reports, governmental reports,
and national statistical bureaus, with each piece of information being fully
indexed as to source. The WomanStats Project constitutes a unique data set
that provides extensive information about women’s issues around the world.
No other dataset on women’s issues in the world ranks its equal, whether in
terms of the breadth and depth of its coverage, the degree of its reliability
checks, or the time spent in its creation. It literally is the best of its kind and
permits a comprehensive, comparative statistical analysis unlike any other.
The data on the nation-state comes from two well-respected international
organizations whose main goal is to collect the information we examine. The
data on arms expenditures comes from the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI describes themselves as “an independent
international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms
69

WOMENSTATS PROJECT, supra note 10.
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control and disarmament,” although they are supported, in part, by the Swedish
government.70 Their data exists free on the web at www.sipri.org, which is
where we obtained this data.71 They are widely considered to be an unbiased
and world-class resource for this material. The information regarding political
freedoms and civil liberties comes from Freedom House, an independent
nongovernmental organization widely considered to provide the most accurate
and comprehensive data on social and political freedoms for countries around
the globe. Their information can be accessed at www.freedomhouse.org, which
is where we obtained the data.72
A total of seventeen outcome variables are considered here, comprising a
rich variety of dimensions of women’s lives, children’s lives, and the influence
on the nation-state, aggregated to the level of the state. Taken together, these
variables show the profound, systematic, and negative influence of polygyny
on women’s health and equality, child welfare, and the nation-state.
Naturally, the state is not the only possible unit of analysis; ethnic enclaves
present another alternative, for instance. But states constitute the basic unit of
analysis in the international system and add comparative context to unique or
anecdotal case material, particularly so when measures of the variables, such as
polygyny, are arguably and reasonably homogenous across the subunits that a
state encompasses.
The variables analyzed below constitute the group of outcomes
theoretically hypothesized to be most likely to be affected by polygyny. In
other words, given how polygyny affects factors such as sex-ratio imbalance as
discussed above, and given its inherent incentives and demands, it was possible
to generate hypotheses about which factors related to women, children, and the
nation-state might be affected by polygyny.
It is not possible to test every variable for its relationship to polygyny, so
we test here those that appear most theoretically plausible and empirically
tractable. For instance, we can hypothesize that polygyny is likely to lead to
higher rates of prostitution, but we cannot test for this relationship because we
do not have enough data on rates of prostitution around the world to make it
70

2015).

About SIPRI, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST., http://www.sipri.org/about (last visited May 17,

71 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST., http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database (last visited May 17, 2015).
72 Reports, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/reports#.VMViCSeJAig (last visited May 17,
2015).
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possible to examine this variable statistically. This does not mean that a
significant relationship does not exist or might not be uncovered in the future
when more comprehensive data on other dependent variables might become
available; it just means that we cannot know whether a statistically significant
relationship exists currently because we are lacking the data to test it. So we
must remain agnostic, barring additional data, on whether such a relationship
exists. In addition, there may be other factors affected by polygyny that exist,
and we did not know or think to test or report them here. However, every
relationship discussed below fell within the conventional accepted standard for
a statistically significant effect given a prior hypothesis. This means that the
likelihood that such relationships occurred by chance and are actually
unrelated to polygyny remain very, very low.
In this analysis, it is very important that we control for other variables that
might directly cause the outcomes we examine. In particular, we need to
control for the effect of GDP, measured in U.S. dollars, on the relationship
between polygyny and the other issues we examine. This is because other
streams of literature have long indicated a strong relationship between
economic development and other aspects of women’s rights.73 If poor
outcomes toward women are entirely attributable to poverty, then naturally,
polygyny does not exert an impact, though such might be erroneously
concluded if sole attention were paid to polygyny in the quantitative analysis.
But controlling for GDP allows for an independent analysis of the influence of
polygyny on the outcome variables concerning equity that comprise our
concern. Combined, these two characteristics constitute an incredibly powerful
tool for the study of polygyny. We deductively assess the hypothesized
relationship between cause (polygyny) and effect (say, domestic violence), and
we do so all other things, including the wealth of a country as measured by
GDP, being equal.
B. Results of Analysis
The polygyny variable categorizes countries according to its prevalence.
Countries were divided into five categories, ranging from places where
polygyny is illegal and uncommon to places where it is legal and common,
meaning more than 25% of women exist in such unions.
73 Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 20, 1990),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/dec/20/more-than-100-million-women-are-missing/; see also
Amartya Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts 2–3 (World Inst. Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 18, 1987).
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We begin with the variable called “discrepancy.” Discrepancy is a variable
that taps (a) whether a country’s laws are in concordance with the United
Nations Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW),74 and (b) whether the country enforces these laws. We use the
2007 coding of this variable in this analysis.75 In the lowest category are those
countries where CEDAW-consonant laws exist and are enforced, while the
highest category refers to countries in which CEDAW-consonant laws are not
present or are not enforced. Intrastate conduct that is not consonant with
CEDAW does occur more often in more polygynous societies.
Figure 1 displays the following: a “scatter” of the data displaying the actual
values of discrepancy and polygyny; the line of best fit, which indicates a
strong positive relationship between polygyny and discrepancy, as expected;
and the confidence interval portraying the accuracy of prediction.
Further evidence of the effect of polygyny comes in the form of a multiple
regression controlling for GDP. These relationships can be seen in Table 1.
The fit statistic here is distributed F(2, 129) = 75.62, and this is of the
magnitude that indicates that the variables are not jointly zero, at a high level
of significance (p < 0.0005). There is more evidence of an association, namely,
the coefficient of determination (i.e., the R2) is 0.54.
Polygyny retains an effect in the context of a multiple regression. The
multiple-regression coefficient for polygyny is positive (β = 0.240888), and the
two-tailed significance test of the null hypothesis can be rejected far beyond
the conventional standard (p < 0.0005). Thus, there is strong confirmation of
the role of polygyny. As polygyny goes up, discrepancy rises.

74
75

opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
Codebook, WOMENSTATS PROJECT, http://womanstats.org/new/codebook/ (last visited May 17, 2015).
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Table 1: Effect of Polygyny and GDP on Discrepancy and Births Per 1,000
Discrepancy
Variable

Births Per 1,000

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

0.240888

0.045434

<0.0005

4.690576

0.426328

<0.0005

GDP

-0.000038

0.000005

<0.0005

-0.000234

0.000044

<0.0005

N
Fit Statistic
R2

132

170

F(2, 129) = 75.62, p < 0.0005

F(2, 167) = 109.23, p < 0.0005

0.54

0.57

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions with discrepancy and births per 1,000 respectively as dependent variables
and polygyny and GDP in each of the regressions as independent variables. For discrepancy, the
effect of polygyny can be interpreted as follows: each unit increase in polygyny increases
discrepancy by 0.24 units, GDP controlled. The coefficient for polygyny in births per 1,000
indicates that for each unit increase in polygyny, birth rates go up by 4.69 units, GDP controlled.
Interpret other OLS coefficients in the same manner.

Women in polygynous countries have more children, on average, than
women in less polygynous states. Figure 2 presents the same visuals as
Figure 1 and with the same punch line: polygyny substantially shapes the
number of births per 1,000 women per year in a state. With a fit statistic of
F(2, 167) = 109.23, p < 0.0005, it is extremely unlikely that the variables are
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simultaneously zero. To this it may be added the coefficient of determination is
0.57.
What then of the effect of polygyny controlling for GDP? Births per 1,000
go up, as per the regression coefficient (β = 4.690576) and the apparent
rejection of the two-tailed statistical test (p < 0.0005).

The scatter of points in Figure 3 suggest that births for women aged 15–19
in countries with higher degrees of polygyny are also on average more
substantial, and this too is what is to be expected of the line of best fit and also
from the relative tightness of the confidence interval.
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To compile multivariate evidence of the effect of polygyny, a multiple
regression controlling for GDP was performed. This can be seen in Table 2.
The fit statistic with F(2, 134) = 41.57 indicates that the variables are not
jointly zero, at a high level of significance (p < 0.0005). There is more
evidence of an association in the form of the coefficient of determination,
which is 0.38.
Table 2: Effect of Polygyny and GDP on Births 15–19 and Female Enrollment (Primary)
Births, Women Aged 15–19

Primary Enrollment for Women

Variable

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

16.885980

2.724238

<0.0005

-4.454723

1.018081

<0.0005

GDP

-0.000865

0.000265

<0.001

0.000001

0.000102

>0.992

N
Fit
Statistic
R2

137

159

F(2, 134) = 41.57, p < 0.0005

F(2, 156) = 11.11, p < 0.0005

0.38

0.12

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from OLS regressions with
births (15–19) and female enrollment (primary) as dependent variables and polygyny and GDP in
each of the regressions as independent variables.

This regression indicates the separate effect of polygyny, what with a large
and positive coefficient (estimated as β = 16.885980, with estimated standard
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error of 2.724238) and a p-value beyond what is conventionally required for
rejection of the null hypothesis (p < 0.0005).
Polygyny also exerts an effect on child welfare. Girls are less likely to
receive an education in primary or secondary school as polygyny becomes
more frequent. The same holds true for boys as well. Boys are less likely to
receive either primary or secondary school education in polygynous societies
than boys raised in non-polygynous societies.
The rates of primary enrollment of girls in school are shown in Table 3 and
Figure 4. Figure 4 suggests that in countries that have lower primary
enrollments of girls, polygyny is more frequent, on average, this returned by
the scatter of data and the line of best fit. The confidence interval suggests
confidence in the predictions.
Table 3: Effect of Polygyny and GDP on Female Enrollment (Secondary) and Male Enrollment
(Primary)
Secondary Enrollment for Women
Primary Enrollment for Men
Variable

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

-12.064350

1.291731

<0.0005

-7.429632

3.675072

<0.045

0.000861

0.000129

<0.0005

-0.000531

0.000367

>0.151

GDP
N
Fit Statistic
2

R

158

159

F(2, 155) = 102.90, p < 0.0005

F(2, 159) = 2.32, p < 0.1012

0.57

0.03

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from OLS regressions with
female enrollment (secondary) and male enrollment (primary) as dependent variables and polygyny
and GDP in each of the regressions as independent variables.
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A two-variable multiple regression fits the outcome variable reasonably
well. Indeed, this is reflected in Table 2 with F(2, 156) = 11.11, p < 0.0005;
R2 = 0.12. As evinced by Figure 4, the coefficient linking polygyny to primary
enrollment for girls is negative (β = -4.454723) and statistically significant
(p < 0.0005), as anticipated. This means that in polygynous countries, girls are
less likely to attend primary schools.
The fifth outcome variable, secondary enrollment of girls in school,
behaves in response to polygyny in the same way as that for primary
enrollment. Figure 5 displays this, composed as it is with the scatter plot, the
slope estimate, and the confidence interval.
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The fit is better, however. Table 3 contains the results (F(2, 155) = 102.90,
p < 0.0005; R2 = 0.57). Moreover, it can be seen that secondary enrollment of
girls declines as polygyny becomes more frequent (β = -12.064350) and in a
statistically significant way (p < 0.0005).
What then of the sixth outcome variable and the seventh, namely, the
degree of primary and secondary enrollment for boys in school? In both cases,
seen in Figures 6 and 7, enrollment for boys appears structured at least
partially by polygyny.
The slope of the line of best fit is negative in both cases: countries with
lower enrollments of boys in primary or secondary institutions are on average
occurring in countries with higher levels of polygyny.
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While these figures are suggestive, multiple regression is ultimately
necessary to untangle the question of the role of polygyny for these outcome
variables, and the technique for both outcome variables confirms how
polygyny affects them, controlling for GDP.
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To begin with, for primary education the fit statistics shown in Table 3,
where F(2, 159) = 2.32, p < 0.1012; R2=0.03, suggest a relationship between
GDP, polygyny, or both, and primary education for boys. Moreover, the slope
(β = -7.429632) is statistically significant (p < 0.045).
Moving to secondary enrollment, Table 4 shows an equation with a good
fit, specifically where F(2, 155) = 94.90, p < 0.0005; R2 = 0.55, indeed far
more so than for primary enrollment. Moreover, secondary enrollment of boys
in more polygynous societies is less common on average as indicated by the
regression coefficient (β = -9.722135) and the two-tailed statistical test
(p < 0.0005).
Table 4: Effect of Polygyny and GDP on Male Enrollment (Secondary) and HIV (Difference)
Secondary Enrollment for Men

HIV

Variable

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

-9.722135

1.165776

<0.0005

0.377731

0.201288

<0.064

GDP

0.000829

0.000117

<0.0005

-0.000021

0.000020

>0.314

N
Fit Statistic
R2

158

94

F(2, 155) = 94.90, p <0.0005

F(2, 91) = 4.85, p < 0.01

0.55

0.10

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from OLS regressions with
male enrollment (secondary) and HIV (difference between women and men) as dependent variables
and polygyny and GDP in each of the regressions as independent variables.

Increased polygyny also heightens the difference in the occurrence of HIV
infection between women and men; women become more likely relative to
men to suffer from HIV as polygyny becomes more common. The differences
in HIV rates, as displayed by Figure 8, are loosely driven by polygyny: the line
of best fit to the scatter cloud notes that the difference between HIV rates
between women and men becomes larger, on average, in countries more beset
by polygyny.
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The fit statistics for the multiple regression indicate a joint or possible one
variable relationship is at stake, where F(2, 91) = 4.85, p < 0.01; R2 = 0.10, it
should be noted that the estimated variance explained is not particularly
impressive.
The relationship between the difference in HIV rates and polygyny survives
a multiple-regression analysis (β = 0.377731) and the two-tailed statistical test
(p < 0.064). To be sure, the latter misses the 0.05 confidence level, but it
should be added that a one-tailed test is reasonable given the expected
direction of the relationship, and this being the case, the multiple-regression
coefficient, though not reflected in the table, is significant at conventional
levels (p < 0.032).
Women in polygynous countries are more likely to marry at a younger age
than women in countries where polygyny is less frequent. The scatter of points
in Figure 9 shows that female marriage age in countries with higher degrees of
polygyny is on average lower, and the line of best fit reinforces this. The
confidence interval adheres at a reasonable level about the regression line.
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Confirming demonstration of the effect of polygyny comes in the form of a
multiple regression controlling for GDP. This is shown in Table 5. This has
three parts. First, the fit statistic indicates that the variables are not jointly zero,
where F(2, 153) = 54.84, p < 0.0005. Second, there is more evidence of an
association, namely, the coefficient of determination is 0.42. Third, the slope
coefficient is negative (β = -0.751378). There can be little statistical doubt the
null hypothesis is false (p < 0.0005).
Table 5: Effect of Polygyny and GDP on Marriage Age (Female) and Maternal Mortality
Female Marriage Age

Maternal Mortality

Variable

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

-0.751378

0.162937

<0.0005

131.537200

19.492820

<0.0005

GDP

0.000114

0.000117

<0.0005

-0.007075

0.002008

<0.0005

N
Fit Statistic
R2

153

170

F(2, 153) = 54.84, p < 0.0005

F(2, 167) = 42.83, p < 0.0005

0.42

0.34

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from OLS regressions with
age of marriage (female) and maternal mortality as dependent variables and polygyny and GDP in
each of the regressions as independent variables.
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Women are more likely to die in childbirth as countries become more
polygynous. The scatter of points in Figure 10 and the accompanying line of
best fit and the confidence interval are consistent with the hypothesis that as
polygyny gets more extensive so does maternal mortality, defined as the
number of women who died in childbirth per 100,000 live births.

A multiple regression affirms that the coefficients linking polygyny and
GDP to maternal mortality are not jointly zero, specifically F(2, 167) = 42.83,
p < 0.0005; R2 = 0.34, meaning that both GDP and polygyny, or one of these
variables, contribute to maternal mortality. Multiple regression with GDP as a
control produces results reinforcing what is suggested by the bivariate
regression.
Polygyny has a separate role to play. Its corresponding coefficient is
estimated as 131.537200, with estimated standard error of 19.492820 and a
p-value beyond what is conventionally required for rejection of the null
hypothesis (p < 0.0005).
Longevity is also affected by polygyny. Life expectancy taps the average
age at which a woman dies in a given country. Polygyny and female life
expectancy are inversely linked: more polygynous countries experience lower
life expectancy for females. In other words, women in more polygynous
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countries die at a younger age on average, likely in part because they are
susceptible to die in childbirth as noted above. Figure 11 portrays in two-space
the relationship between female life expectancy and polygyny, and the
according line of best fit, surrounded on either side by the confidence interval.
In polygynous societies, female life expectancy is lower than in societies
without it.

It can be seen from Table 6 that a multiple regression with polygyny and
GDP as predictors fares well, specifically F(2, 153) = 74.28, p < 0.0005;
R2 = 0.47. The same may be said for polygyny considered on its own, GDP
serving as a control. The coefficient is negative (β = -4.479878), and a high
degree of confidence can be expressed in the rejection of the null hypothesis
(p < 0.0005).
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Table 6: Effect of Polygyny and GDP on Female Life Expectancy
Variable

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

-4.479878

0.535178

<0.0005

GDP

0.000293

0.000055

<0.0005

N
Fit Statistic
R2

153
F(2, 153) = 74.28, p < 0.0005
0.47

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics with
female life expectancy as a dependent variable and polygyny and GDP in the
regression as independent variables.

Ordered logistic regression was used to estimate the relationship between
the following dependent variables and polygyny, with GDP used in all
analyses as a control: sex trafficking, female genital mutilation (FGM),
domestic violence (DVS), and inequity in family law. From a statistical
standpoint, this technique has many advantages over an ordinary-least-squares
regression when the dependent variable is comprised of a limited number of
ordered, unevenly spaced categories.
Sex trafficking increases in more polygynous countries. This variable
divides countries into five categories based on their degree of compliance with
the Trafficking Persons Act of 2000. The lowest signifies that there are laws
against sex trafficking, while the highest means that sex trafficking is
permitted and that the country is not in compliance with the law. In the current
analysis, the five-point scale in the WomanStats database was collapsed into
four categories because there were not a sufficient number of observations in
two of the categories. Specifically, we collapsed the lowest two categories
since only one country fit into the lowest category. When this happens, the
coefficients cannot be properly estimated, so this is standard practice in such
cases. Table 7 displays the results of a proposed model of predictors consisting
of polygyny and GDP. The likelihood-ratio test for the model produces
χ2(3) = 64.96, which yields p < 0.0005. Consequently, it is very unlikely that
the coefficients linking our independent variables to sex trafficking are both
zero. The pseudo-R2 equals 0.17, which suggests a relationship, though the
degree cannot be quantified statistically.
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Table 7: Effects of Polygyny and GDP on Trafficking
Sex Trafficking
Variable

FGM

Odds Ratio

S.E.

p-value

Odds Ratio

S.E.

p-value

Polygyny

1.251951

0.141874

<0.047

3.763611

0.944152

<0.0005

GDP

0.999901

0.000018

<0.0005

1.000018

0.000019

>0.365

N

154

74

LR χ2(3)

64.96, p < 0.0005

48.53, p < 0.0005

Pseudo R2

0.17

0.31

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from two separate ordinal
logistic regressions with family law and trafficking, respectively as dependent variables and in each
ordinal logistic regression polygyny and GDP as independent variables. Odds ratios indicate how the
odds of the dependent variable change in response to shifts in an independent variable. For instance,
changing polygyny by one unit alters the odds of being in the uppermost category of the ordered,
discrete family law scale versus the other categories of domestic violence by 2.16 times, GDP
controlled. Examples of the consequences of a change in polygyny on predicted probabilities of
family law as well as the other dependent variables are presented in the text.

A two-tailed test for the hypothesis that polygyny has no effect on sex
trafficking may be rejected using a standard level of significance (p < 0.047).
One demonstration of the effect of polygyny is via the odds ratio: a movement
from one level of polygyny to one immediately subsequent to it increases the
odds of being in the uppermost category of the ordered, discrete sex trafficking
scale versus the other categories by a factor of 1.25 times, GDP controlled.
Envisioning the effect of polygyny on sex trafficking via an odds ratio can
be supplemented with a consideration of the effect of polygyny on predicted
probabilities associated with categories of sex trafficking. In calculating the
degree of association, though, it needs emphasizing that while odds ratios do
not turn on the values of polygyny or GDP—where they are fixed, in
particular—the predicted probabilities for sex trafficking must be calculated
for levels of polygyny and some fixed value for GDP. This is due to the fact
that the probabilities associated with categories of the dependent variables are
nonlinear expressions of the independent variables: the interpretation of the
effect of polygyny for one (fixed) value of GDP may be somewhat different
than that for another, whereas the odds ratio associated with a shift from one
level of polygyny to the one immediately following is the same regardless of
whether one starts with, say, polygyny equals two or polygyny equals three.
However, the same is not true when the matter turns to predicted
probabilities for sex trafficking, or any of our other ordinal dependent

MCDERMOTT_COWDEN GALLEYSPROOFS

2015]

POLYGYNY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

5/19/2015 2:17 PM

1801

variables. Even so, while caution must be exercised, it is still the case that a
portrait of predicted probabilities has a substantive and visual appeal,
particularly when accompanied by a figure plotting the effects.

Such is the case with Figure 13. The y-axis ranges from 0–1, as expected.
The x-axis is polygyny, with graphically represented steps of one from 0–4,
also expected. What do the lines represent? How can they be interpreted?
For a particular category, say sex trafficking equals four, the lines trace the
effect of polygyny from one level to another and, further, across its range: how
a change, say, from polygyny equals two to polygyny equals three, alters the
predicted probabilities of sex trafficking when the value of sex trafficking is
four.
Notice also that the slopes linking various categories step by step through
the range of polygyny are not identical. For instance, when sex trafficking
equals one (i.e., pr(1)), its associated predicted probabilities generally go down
when polygyny goes down, while the general movement of predicted
probabilities when sex trafficking equals four goes up as polygyny becomes
more common.
What this means, in fact, is that as polygyny becomes more frequent,
trafficking becomes more prevalent and women more victimized. As signaled
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by the figure, the leap in predicted probabilities for this value of trafficking is
impressive, particularly since GDP is controlled at its median value, a good
choice given that this is a measure of central tendency.
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), sometimes referred to as female cutting,
also increases as countries become more polygynous. This practice exerts a
detrimental effect on women’s health because it can affect subsequent bladder,
bowel, and childbirth processes, particularly if it is badly done or conducted
under unsanitary conditions, as often occurs. This practice is often referred to
as female circumcision, but this represents a clear misnomer and euphemism.
As Toubia writes in the New England Journal of Medicine, “The mildest form,
clitoridectomy, is anatomically equivalent to amputation of the penis. Under
the conditions in which most procedures take place, female circumcision
constitutes a health hazard with short- and long-term physical complications
and psychological effects.”76
In our analysis, the highest category includes countries where more than
10%, and sometimes upwards of 50%, of women have sustained such cutting.
FGM is divided by countries into five categories and then collapsed into three
for purposes of the analysis because of the small number of cases for particular
values of the variable. The number of cases here is comparatively small,
suggesting perhaps that caution is warranted in interpreting the results. But
such is not written in stone; alternatively, it might be speculated that countries
with the highest levels of FGM do not report this, perhaps looking away,
perhaps encouraging it, the impact of this being a suppressor effect—the
relationship might look even stronger were data available for all countries.
This said, the likelihood-ratio test for our model of two variables is distributed
χ2(3) = 48.53, which yields p < 0.0005. So we can reject at conventional levels
the hypothesis of a joint, null relationship between FGM and our two
independent variables.
The pseudo-R2, which equals 0.31, is the highest so far seen. A linkage
between polygyny and FGM is confirmed statistically with a very high degree
of significance (p < 0.0005). Moreover, the slope (β = 3.763611) is statistically
significant (p < 0.0005). This magnitude is especially impressive and is
confirmed by the shape of the lines in Figure 14. At its most extreme, FGM has
predicted probabilities that move almost in lockstep with polygyny.

76

Nahid Toubia, Female Circumcision as a Public Health Issue, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 712, 712 (1994).
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Of critical importance is the question of whether polygyny helps cause
violence toward women. To answer this question, an omnibus measure of
domestic violence was employed, one that incorporates domestic violence,
rape, marital rape, and honor killings, as well as the extent and strength of the
enforcement of the laws prohibiting these crimes in any given state. And
indeed, as confirmed in Table 8 and Figure 15, polygynous countries contain
more domestic violence against women. Table 8 shows the likelihood-ratio test
for our model of two variables is distributed χ2(3) = 76.03, which yields
p < 0.0005. So we can reject at conventional levels the hypothesis of a joint,
null relationship between domestic violence and our two independent
variables.

MCDERMOTT_COWDEN GALLEYSPROOFS

1804

5/19/2015 2:17 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1767

Table 8: Effects of Polygyny and GDP on Domestic Violence and Inequity
DVS
Variable

Inequity

Odds Ratio

S.E.

p value

Odds Ratio

S.E.

p value

Polygyny

1.466550

0.163000

<0.001

3.059176

0.423937

<0.0005

GDP

0.999916

0.000015

<0.0005

0.999935

0.000014

<0.0005

N

168

170

LR χ2(3)

76.03, p < 0.0005

139.07, p < 0.0005

Pseudo R2

0.19

0.27

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from two separate ordinal
logistic regressions with DVS and inequity, respectively as dependent variables and in each case
polygyny and GDP as independent variables.

A supplementary suggestion of a relationship comes courtesy of the
pseudo-R2, which equals 0.19. Our test statistic suggests that one or both of our
variables drive domestic violence. So what then of the effect of polygyny? A
linkage between polygyny and the DVS is confirmed statistically with a very
high degree of significance (p < 0.001). The odds ratio may be interpreted by
assessing how moving polygyny by one unit upwards shifts the odds of being
in the uppermost category of the ordered, discrete domestic violence scale
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versus the other categories of domestic violence. Indeed, the odds increase by
1.47 times, GDP controlled. For the value of GDP we have chosen, it can be
seen that domestic violence at its worst expression, i.e., pr(4), and as expressed
in terms of predicted probabilities, goes up as considered across the range of
polygyny (Figure 15). There is also a dramatic on-balance shift for the
category of domestic violence equals two, i.e., pr(2).
Polygyny also affects the treatment of men and women before the law.
Differences in the legal treatment of women versus men become greater, to the
detriment of women, in more polygynous societies. We refer to this variable as
inequity. Inequity measures the degree of equal treatment of men and women
before the law. More particularly, inequity is defined as the relative standing of
men and women under law, indexed on an ordinal scale. At the low end are
countries where the legal age of marriage is eighteen or higher, where women
may choose their spouse, where divorce is possible, where both partners are
treated equitably by law, where abortion is permitted, and where women may
inherit property. Countries at the high end permit marriage at younger than
eighteen years of age; for example, such countries have laws that permit girls
aged twelve or less to be married and also have laws more restrictive to
women’s rights on the other facets of this omnibus measure. Table 8 contains
the results.
Our two-variable model performs well, as expressed by a likelihood-ratio
test, with a distribution χ2(3) = 139.07, which yields p < 0.0005. So we can
reject at conventional levels the hypothesis of a joint, null relationship between
inequity and our two independent variables. As noted and absent a distribution,
the pseudo-R2 equals 0.27 conveys the same information as the likelihood-ratio
statistic.
More evidence for the hypothesis that polygyny matters with regard to
inequity comes in the form of a two-tailed statistical test of the null hypothesis
that it does not (p < 0.0005). The accompanying information about predicted
probabilities, displayed in Figure 16, is difficult to summarize and is perhaps
our most notable manifestation of nonlinearities. We observe what we would
expect: dips on balance when inequity manifests in its greatest form as
polygyny turns from its lowest to its greatest amount, and the reverse being so
when polygyny travels from its greatest to its lowest, driving as it does
inequity at its lowest level.
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Polygyny also has effects that extend beyond the outcome variables already
considered. Polygyny can exert effects on various aspects of domestic and
international politics for a given nation-state. First, to the extent that junior
boys who have been excised from polygynous communities become wards of
the state, the cost of educating, socializing, housing, feeding, and job training
gets transferred from the family to taxpayers. Second, to the extent that
secondary wives can obtain aid from the state under laws designed to help
women with dependent children but without male support, financial costs for
such support can escalate as well, since polygynous unions are sometimes not
recognized by the state, especially in more Western countries.
Moreover, the effects of polygyny on the nation-state can be quantified
along certain dimensions. States with higher rates of polygyny spend more
money per capita on defense, particularly on arms expenditures for weapons.
More specifically, we test whether defense expenditures have a partial
foundation in polygyny. Defense expenditures are surely a crucial foreign
policy stance, an orientation towards the outside world and perhaps an
indication of the inner workings of policy elites. So polygyny is examined here
for the extent to which it can exert influential impacts beyond the private and
domestic spheres. We further investigate whether states with high levels of
polygyny concurrently have low degrees of freedom, the former being a cause
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of the latter and the latter a crucial measure of the internal workings of the state
and the quality of life for all citizens.
We begin with defense expenditures. The Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute has collected data about per capita defense expenditures. A
particular advantage of this measure, aside from its being well respected and
widely used, is that the unit of the analysis is the state, permitting what we
have already done: particularly, a comparison of states with lower versus
higher levels of polygyny with states that have lower or higher levels of
outcomes negative towards women on average. Our question is whether this
variable is related to polygyny.
Figure 17, complete with the scatter plot of data, the line of best fit, and the
confidence interval, is consistent with the interpretation that states with higher
amounts of per capita defense expenditures are more likely on average to have
higher degrees of polygyny. Table 9 confirms this. The fit statistic confirms
this marginally (F(2, 91) = 2.73, p < 0.0687), and the correlation coefficient is
0.228663 and is statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.025). We
can conclude from this that states with higher expenditures are, on average,
more likely to have higher degrees of polygyny as well. This is as we
anticipated.
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Table 9: Effects of Polygyny and GDP on Freedom and Defense Expenditures
SIPRI
Variable

Freedom

Coefficient

S.E.

p-value

Odds Ratio

S.E.

Polygyny

0.228663

0.100777

<0.025

0.682354

0.076193

<0.001

GDP

0.000004

0.000010

>0.68

1.000076

0.000020

<0.0005

N

Pseudo-R2

p-value

137

166

F(2, 91) = 2.73, p < 0.0687

LR χ2(2) = 52.28, p < 0.0005

0.2171

0.1463

Notes: Coefficients, associated standard errors, p-values, and fit statistics from one OLS regression
(defense expenditures) and one ordinal logistic regression (freedom). The OLS regression and the
ordinal logistic regression both employ the same independent variables, viz., polygyny and GDP.
Still, the interpretation of the coefficient for polygyny in the OLS regression (as so for GDP) is not
the same as that for the odds ratio for polygyny (as so for GDP).

Polygyny also influences the degree of rights and freedoms experienced by
citizens in a given country. Specifically, states with higher rates of polygyny
display fewer political rights and civil liberties than those that have less
polygyny. To be sure, a good deal about the liberties women enjoy, and the
ones stripped from them because of their gender, can easily be inferred using
data from the project. But here, the consideration of liberties is more generally
construed within society at large, specifically those experienced by both men
and women, and there is no measured analog for that in the WomanStats
Project database. However, Freedom House has an excellent, well-thought-of
omnibus measure, described as the “freedom in the world” historical
rankings.77
Summarizing the results of the ordered-logistic regression, it can been seen
from Table 9, χ2(2)=52.28, p < 0.0005. Thus, we can dispense with the null
hypothesis that there is jointly no effect of the predictors of the measured level
of freedom. It is also the case that polygyny survives as an influence, GDP
controlled (p < 0.0005). Though elsewhere not to be as diagnostic in the same
ways as the likelihood-ratio statistics, the pseudo-R2 equals 0.1463, suggestive
of a relationship between at least one of the variables and freedom.
The odds ratio is 0.682354 and statistically significant (p < 0.0005),
meaning that moving one category upward in polygyny lowers by 0.682354
times the likelihood that a country will be free as opposed to the two (ordered)
77 Freedom
in the Word, FREEDOM HOUSE,
world#.VVN34vlVikp (last visited May 17, 2015).

https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-
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alternative. The final figure, Figure 18, visually shows how, when GDP is
controlled for at its median, changes in polygyny affect the level of freedom of
a state. As an example, look at the predicted probabilities for a state as “not
free.” These probabilities, when looked at when polygyny is absent, are lower
than the predicted probabilities when at least 25% of women are captured by
polygyny.

III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Examining over 170 countries around the world, we find that polygynous
structures increase violence toward women and children, decrease civil rights
and political liberties in the state more broadly, and increase the allocation of
resources in society toward weapons procurement. Polygyny exerts economic,
physical, and political consequences for societies in which such practices
remain prevalent. For example, Kanazawa shows early menarche in
polygynous countries and unrelated work has shown that early sexual trauma,
common in polygyny where many girls are forced into early marriage to much
older, abusive men, leads to increased morbidity, decline in longevity, and
intergenerational transfer of changes in genetic expression.78 Further, children

78 Satoshi Kanazawa, Why Father Absence Might Precipitate Early Menarche: The Role of Polygyny,
22 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 331–34 (2001).
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of young mothers do worse in education, have worse economic prospects, and
remain at higher risk for crime.79
Our results could, in theory, be confounded by the presence of other
variables not considered in our analysis, such as religious affiliation or political
system. The strengths of statistical association might also be modified by
taking into account sociocultural similarities or historical continuities among
countries. Controlling for such variables represents an important analytical
challenge that has been solved when relationships between sample points are
linguistic or cultural but not for countries as a whole since they include
multiple populations. Data are currently not available to analyze by distinct
cultural units. Future research may be able to test such hypotheses when
further data become available. Furthermore, it is possible that causation can go
in both directions. For example, higher rates of female mortality arising from
violence towards women could lead to polygyny being favored.
Nevertheless, the consistency and strength of our findings across multiple
independent measures of violence, together with their conformity to a
well-supported anthropological theory about the impact of polygyny on the
propensity for male violence, are clearly suggestive. In view of the importance
of recognizing sources of violence that can be modified by appropriate
legislative action, we believe our results warrant further intense investigation.
Moreover, policymakers would have to change multiple laws across multiple
domains to exert as much of an effect on these negative outcomes toward
women and children as could be accomplished by the abolition of polygyny.
We conclude the evidence in favor of the role of polygyny is sufficiently
strong that efforts should be made to understand more clearly the contexts in
which, and the mechanisms by which, polygyny fosters local and institutional
violence towards women and children, as well as its role in undergirding
support for the suppression of political rights and civil liberties. In addition,
polygyny exerts its effects on violence against women independent of the
effects of sex ratio alone, so the social, cultural, and institutional practices that
support its existence manifest an impact that goes beyond merely increasing
the number of unmarried men in society.

79 Sara Jaffee et al., Why Are Children Born to Teen Mothers at Risk for Adverse Outcomes in Young
Adulthood? Results from a 20-Year Longitudinal Study, 13 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 377, 377–78 (2001);
see also J. Brooks-Gunn & Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr, The Children of Adolescent Mothers: Physical, Academic,
and Psychological Outcomes, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 224 (1986).
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Our data also show that increased GDP was generally associated with
women having greater freedom from violence. We suggest that wealthier
countries have more resources, and are thus possibly more willing to devote
such resources, to accurately collect data on many aspects of society, including
the treatment of women and children. We also suspect that as income rises,
societies have increased wherewithal to treat women and children better.
Possible explanations include women having more power because they
generate a higher percentage of society’s wealth, allowing them to be less
economically dependent on men. In addition, wealthier societies might monitor
conformity to the law more accurately, thanks to their greater resources.
However, the problem of violence against women is not obviated by increasing
wealth alone, as attested by the fact that many wealthy countries continue to
suffer high rates of violence against women, including domestic violence, rape,
and murder.80 Poverty, while clearly important to the issue, represents only
part of the problem generating violence against women. Polygyny constitutes
an additional important piece of the puzzle. As long as this kind of family
structure continues its legitimate status throughout much of the world, its
consequences will continue to exert independent effects on the violent
outcomes of concern. In other words, polygyny as well as poverty will have to
be tackled before societies can gain a firm grasp on the challenge of reducing
or eliminating violence against women and children within them.
More than simply increasing the number of men unable to find mates,
polygynous practices also encourage control over women in many areas of
social and political life, a practice that is required in order to maintain control
over reproductive access. This analysis demonstrates that such control often
devolves into systematic practices of violence against women and children. In
this way, polygyny may represent a more sensitive measure of patriarchy than
sex ratio, since sex ratio includes women outside reproductive age. This
age-structure distribution may be particularly important with regard to older
women; it may not matter much if there are a lot of old women compared to
old men in terms of the impact of sex ratio on violence against women, but it
may matter a great deal if most younger women are engaged in polygynous
unions.
Polygyny appears to constitute a sizeable and independent piece of the
puzzle explaining the emergence of violence directed at women and children.
80 See, e.g., S. LAUREL WELDON, PROTEST, POLICY, AND THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 9–11 (2002).
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In addition, the institutions necessary to keep it in place may help explain some
of the patterns of repression across the globe. And yet this is a practice that
will not necessarily be easily changed. One solution that has been offered to
the problem of polygyny as a source of violence towards women might be to
increase female social emancipation through education. Yet, Lesthaeghe and
his coauthors found that increasing female literacy did not lead to a decline in
polygyny rates, at least in sub-Saharan Africa.81 Reading does not help if the
only information one encounters merely reconfirms preexisting beliefs. As
long as male control of reading material is maintained, female literacy alone
cannot begin to shift patterns of patriarchal control until women begin to
possess the financial, economic, and social foundations of independence as
well.
For those interested in human rights, the relationship between polygyny
and violence against women should be particularly alarming. Indeed, an irony
emerges from our analysis: conventional attempts to empower women in
polygynous culture can be expected to make matters worse because they will
increase the hostility felt by many men toward women and the cultural values
that advocate for female emancipation. We do not conclude that such efforts,
including advocacy of women’s rights and education of both sexes, should be
discontinued. But the inherent obstacles that women face should be
appreciated. The cultural and political diversity of polygynous cultures creates
many different opportunities for sensitively designed efforts to work, even if
the emancipation of women can be predicted to encounter continuing
resistance in various regions, including especially those culturally dominated
by polygyny. It is important to remain aware of the fact that areas where such
practices are common may prove more impervious to an improvement in
women’s rights than areas where such practices are less frequent.
After all, polygyny does not necessarily stem from women being
uneducated. If it is rooted in a local socioeconomic system, economics rather
than ideas may need to change in order to alter the incentives sustaining its
practice. Empowering women alone is not enough. If the underlying causes of
the male domination of the rights of reproduction remain unchanged, female
emancipation will be limited. Such efforts therefore need to be complemented
with strategies that address the deep causes of patriarchy, including
polygynous family structures.

81

Lesthaeghe et al., supra note 45, at 48–51.
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We do not intend here to assume that all practices that most westerners see
as repressive of women, such as the wearing of the veil, need to be changed.
But neither do we intend to embrace cultural relativism to the disservice of
basic human rights and peaceful coexistence. Rather, we take note of
Abu-Lughod’s directive to recognize the historical and economic forces that
engendered this reality and work to transform it within the context of a
universal responsibility to mitigate injustice and prevent harm and injury to all
humans while respecting genuine cultural preferences that do not impinge on
basic human rights.82 With this in mind, we offer two observations.
The urban explosion of young, unmarried men could produce great social
and political volatility. High-status men may still be able to secure lots of
wives, and low-status men will still not be able to garner any wives, but since
there will inevitably be more of the latter than the former, it becomes possible
to rally the low-status males to overturn the system through sheer numbers.
Establishing alliances with these disenfranchised men can only serve to
encourage the transition that would be best for individual women and society
alike. These men may be facilitated in this transition by women who may
prefer not sharing a husband, which admittedly may not encompass all women.
A bigger question concerns polygyny. Polygynous culture, where men
control women and their reproduction, supports and encourages violence both
within these societies as well as outside of them. Polygynous cultures leave
many young, lower-class men without sexual partners and prone toward
violence.83 They also provide men who have daughters with a certain amount
of wealth and status that results from their control over a scarce resource.84
Elaborate cultures and hierarchies rest on this control over women forced into
passivity.
Cultural values that favor female emancipation and threaten to replace
passive participants with independent women can frighten and enrage men in
areas where control and domination of the productive and reproductive
capacities of women embody an important source of power. In the face of their
own poverty and unemployment, men who lose control over women may feel
that they are left with nothing of value. Such a prospect renders these men
particularly dangerous because they have nothing to lose in fighting a force
82 See Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on
Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783 (2002).
83 Hudson & Den Boer, supra note 7, at 25–26; see also Smuts & Smuts, supra note 68.
84 Marlowe, supra note 68, at 54.
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that threatens their only status and prospects for reproduction. As long as
polygynous marital practices offer opportunities for men to use their control of
women for their own personal power, wealth, and status, any threat to such a
system will spawn rage and violence in response. And these systems will leave
large numbers of poor men without women.
History suggests two sets of options that governments confronted with too
many men have engaged to try to deal with this problem.85 They can try
policies that reduce the number of men, either through violence or by exporting
them to other countries as missionaries or mercenaries.86 Or they can try to
increase the number of women, by importing brides or by reducing processes
such as sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, female death in childbirth,
and early childhood death of girls.87 But these are stop-gap measures. As long
as polygyny persists, countries run a high risk of violence, which may be
exported beyond their borders. Only when these structures no longer present an
opportunity for such men to benefit from their dominance of women will their
emancipation no longer present a fundamental threat to these cultures.
It may be time, therefore, for human-rights advocates to consider a
campaign to ban polygyny. The risk is that this would be seen as one more
attempt to impose Western values on the developing world in ways that remain
antithetical to their traditional cultural values. But just as the developing world
might point to the seeds of terrorism in Western economic and political
injustice,88 so too can the developed world discover some of the sources of
violence and repression in the social injustice inherent in polygyny. Abolishing
polygyny and encouraging female emancipation is a formula for a safer world.
By prohibiting polygyny, we reduce social inequities, violence toward women
and children, and the proliferation of single men and the violence they
perpetuate, as well as increase political rights and civil liberties for all.
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Hudson & Den Boer, supra note 7, at 26–28.
Id.
87 See id.
88 See WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM 3, 10 (2d ed. 2012);
Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 161
(2005).
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